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APPLICATION OF ANTILAPSE STATUTES
TO APPOINTMENTS MADE BY WILL
Susan F. French*
Powers of appointment are justifiably popular tools of the modern
estate planner.1 Their popularity rests largely on the flexibility of dis-
position they introduce into a long-term trust and on the means they
provide for taking advantage of various opportunities to reduce taxa-
tion.2 In addition, a power of appointment permits the holder many of
the advantages of property ownership without some of its correspond-
ing liabilities.3
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; A.B., 1964, Stanford
University; J.D., 1967, University of Washington.
1. See, e.g., A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 689-782 (3d ed. 1961); J. TRACHTMAN,
ESTATE PLANNING 201-11 (1968); H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, LIFETIME AND TESTA-
MENTARY ESTATE PLANNING 58-60 (7th ed. 1966); Halbach, The Use of Powers of
Appointment in Estate Planning, 45 IowA L. REv. 691 (1960).
2. A life estate coupled with a general power of appointment, testamentary or
presently exercisable, will qualify for the marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5);
Rusoff, Power of Appointment and Estate Planning, 10 J. FAM. L. 443, 457 (1971).
Ownership of a power to appoint to anyone other than the donee, his estate, or the
creditors of his estate does not subject the appointive property to taxation in the donee's
estate. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1). Prior to adoption of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), non-general powers were frequently used in
connection with generation-skipping devices. A. CASNER, supra note 1, at 717; Cole-
man, The Special Power of Appointment in Estate Planning, 109 TR. & ET. 920
(1970); Jarvis, A Survey of Generation Skipping Transfers-The Present Rule and
the Possibility of Reform, 22 Sw. L.J. 482, 487 (1968). The impact of the generation-
skipping tax of the new Act, I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622, on utilization of non-general pow-
ers remains to be seen. See generally Bloom, The Generation-Skipping Loophole: Nar-
rowed, but Not Closed, by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 53 WASH. L. REV. 31 (1977).
For other articles discussing tax aspects of powers of appointment, see Allen, Use of
Trusts and Powers of Appointment in Estate Planning, 21 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J. 15
(1967); Brown, A Case Against an Additional Tax on Generation-Skipping Transfers,
106 TR. & EST. 997 (1967); Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 55 (1951); Note, Special Powers of Appointment and the Gift Tax: The Im-
pact of Self v. United States, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 284 (1969).
3. A prime liability of ownership, of course, is availability of assets to creditors.
Ownership of a special power does not subject the appointive property to the donee's
creditors, because the donee has no beneficial interest. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
326 (1940). In the absence of a statute, creditors of the holder of a general power
cannot reach the appointive property unless the donee has exercised the power. Quinn
v. Tuttle, 104 N.H. 1, 177 A.2d 391 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 327 (1940).
When the donee has exercised the power, courts split; the majority hold that the
assets are available for the donee's debts. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 329-330
(1940); Etate of Masson, 142 Cal. App. 2d 510, 298 P.2d 619 (1956). This may be
true even if the appointment is defective. Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (188 1). A minor-
ity of courts refuse to allow the donee's creditors to reach the assets unless they are
appointed to the decedent's estate. See, e.g., St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 259
405
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Although litigation involving powers of appointment has been
relatively infrequent, 4 the increasing use of powers over the last few
decades forebodes increasing litigation in this field. Anticipating this
development, several states have enacted fairly comprehensive stat-
utes which attempt to set forth in accessible form certain aspects of
the common law of powers, make certain revisions in the common
law, and replace outmoded statutes on powers. 5 One area in which
both the common law and the recent statutes are inadequate is in the
application of antilapse statutes to appointments made by will.
This article examines the development of the common law in this
area and the modern statutory treatment of the application of anti-
lapse statutes to testamentary appointments. The problems created by
both are then analyzed, possible judicial solutions are explored, and
finally a statutory solution is proposed. 6
I. THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED
Since at least 1748, 7 it has been settled that an appointee under a
power exercised by will must be alive at the effective time of the ap-
pointment to take the property. 8 If the appointee fails to survive the
Ky. 802, 83 S.W.2d 471 (1935). See also Annot., 97 A.L.R. 1070 (1935); Annot.,
59 A.L.R. 1510 (1929).
4. There has been more tax litigation dealing with powers of appointment than
litigation of other sorts. For example, from 1967 to 1977, at least 41 cases were de-
cided under I.R.C. § 2041, including 19 in circuit courts of appeal, 10 in federal dis-
trict courts, six in Tax Court, and six in state courts. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 2041 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977). In contrast, from 1967, when New York enacted its powers act.
to 1977, there were only 19 cases reported which cited the statute in any way. N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 10-1.1 to -10.8 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1380.1-1391.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 556.111-.133 (1970); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 10-1.I to-10.8
(McKinney 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 702.01-.21 (West Supp. 1977). See also
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 502.62-.79 (West 1947 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
6. The terminology employed in this article generally follows that of the Restate-
ment of Property. A power of appointment is a power to designate the transferees of
property or the shares among designated transferees, within limits specified by the
creator of the power. A general power is one which can be exercised in favor of the
donee or the donee's estate; a special power is one to appoint to or among the mem-
bers of a group not unreasonably large. The creator of the power is the "donor," and
the holder of the power, the "donee"; the permissible appointees are the "objects" of
the power. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 318-320 (1940).
7. Oke v. Heath, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748). The question was raised earlier in
Bird v. Lockey, 23 Eng. Rep. 1086 (Ch. 1716), but the resolution was not clearly
dispositive of the issue.
8. An appointment by will takes effect upon the death of the donee. L. SIMES &
A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 985 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
SIMES & SMITH].
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donee, the appointment is ineffective and the property passes in de-
fault of appointment. 9 A similar doctrine has long been applied to
transfers made by will: the taker must be alive at the testator's death
or the bequest "lapses" and the property passes by the residuary
clause or by intestacy. 10
To deal with the problems created by the lapse of testamentary
gifts, "antilapse" statutes have been enacted in England 1 and most of
the American states.12 Although there are considerable variations,
most of the statutes provide that if a bequest to a relative of the testa-
tor lapses, the surviving issue of the relative take the lapsed bequest in
his or her place.' 3 Of these statutes, only Wisconsin's expressly applies
9. Id. § 984. Property "passing in default" passes under an express or implied
provision in the creating instrument which is to be effective in default of appointment,
by the residuary clause of the donor's will, or by intestacy from the donor. If the
donor is alive, the property may revert to him. Id. § 1031. Under certain circumstances,
however, an alternative appointment may be found in the donee's will. Under the
capture doctrine, an implied alternative appointment to the donee's estate may be
found in an attempt to exercise the power. See, e.g., Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass. 144,
191 N.E. 360 (1934). By case law in Massachusetts, the residuary clause of the donee's
will exercises the power without express reference to the power. Second Bank-State
St. Trust Co. v. Yale Alumni Fund, 338 Mass. 520, 524, 156 N.E.2d 57, 60 (1959).
A number of jurisdictions reach the same result by statute. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §
1386.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
10. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE*LAW OF WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1953).
11. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 26, § 33.
12. ALA. CODE § 43-1-13 (1960); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.240 (1972); Aiuz. REV.
STAT. § 14-2605 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-410 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE § 92
(West 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-605 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-176
(West 1960); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 2313 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.603
(West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-812 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-605 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 49 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE
ANN. § 29-1-6-1(g)(2) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273
(West 1964); KAN. STAT. § 59-615 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.400 (1972); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1008 (1964); MD. EST. & TRuSTS CODE ANN. § 4-403 (1974);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 22 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); MicH. ComP. LAWS
§ 702.11 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-605 (West 1975); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 91-5-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.460 (Vernon 1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 91A-2-605 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2343 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.200
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:12 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-13 (West
1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-605 (1976); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 3-3.3 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-09-05 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 84, § 142 (West 1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.395 (1975); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2514(9) (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-19 (1969); S.C. CODE
§ 21-7-470 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 29-6-8 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-306 (1977); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-605 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 558 (1974); VA. CODE § 64.1-64
(1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.110 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-3 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West 1971).
The only states without antilapse statutes are Hawaii, Louisiana, and Wyoming.
13. The principal variations in the antilapse statutes are in the size of the group
407
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AMERICAN & ENGLISH ANTILAPSE STATUTES
TAKERS SUBSTITUTED BY ANTILAPSE STATUTE
Issue (expressed as issue, lineal
descendants, descendants, children






Lineal Ala., Ark.,* IlI.,* Ind., Great Britain
F- descendants Miss., Tex.H
Grandparent Alas.,* Ariz.,* Colo.,*
or lineal Del.,* Fla.,* Idaho,*
u) descendant Minn.,* Mont.,* N.D.*
thereof
Relative Me., Mass.,* Mich.,t Mo.,
Z Neb.,* N.M.,* Nev., Ohio,
< Okla., Ore.,* S.D., Wash.,
>- Wis.**
Kindred California, Vermont
H Any Ga., Ky.,* N.H., N.C.,*
U devisee R.I., Tenn.,* Va., W. Va. Iowa Maryland*
H Other Conn. [child, grandchild,
[brackets sibling],
indicate Kan. [spouse, lineal descendant,
CO for whom or relative within six degrees],
. the issue N.J. [child, descendant, sibling],
4 will be N.Y.* [issue, sibling],
< substituted] Pa.* [issue, sibling or child
H" of sibling], Utah [heirs]
*Statute expressly applies to class gifts.
**Statute expressly applies to class gifts, if devisee died after execution of the will.
tLimited to relatives within fourth degree of the testator, unless they are also
residuary takers, in which case the issue will be substituted.
No statutes: Hawaii, Louisiana, Wyoming.
to an appointment made by will. 14
After tracing the development of the doctrine that the appointee
under a power exercised by will must survive the donee, this article, in
Part II, examines the cases dealing with the question whether anti-
of devisees and legatees covered. All statutes except those of England, Maryland. and
Ohio substitute surviving issue for the predeceased taker. See Table supra.
14. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West 1971).
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lapse statutes can be applied to appointments under testamentary
powers. Part II proceeds historically from English to American cases
and then to recent statutes. The principal question dealt with is
whether an appointment made by will is a "devise" or "bequest"
within the meaning of the antilapse statutes. Whether a power is gen-
eral or special has significantly affected some courts' answers to this
question.
In Part III, three major problems are treated. The first is whether a
distinction should be drawn between appointments made under gen-
eral powers and those made under special powers. In Part III-A, the
positions of the various courts and commentators on the applicability
of antilapse statutes to appointments made under special powers are
analyzed and the conclusion reached that the statutes should be ap-
plied.
Even where application of antilapse statutes to appointments under
special powers is accepted, courts have refused to do so if the issue of
the predeceased appointee do not fit the class description used to
designate the objects of the power. Whether this position, also taken
by recent statutes, is desirable is discussed in Part III-B.
The third problem, treated in Part III-C, is raised by those anti-
lapse statutes which apply only to gifts to a relative of the testator.
Where the predeceased appointee is related to the donor but not to the
donee of the power, courts have refused to apply such antilapse stat-
utes. The same result is to be expected under the recent statutes. The
desirability of this result is examined for both general and special
powers. After concluding that the result is not desirable, the possibil-
ity of construing general antilapse statutes to cover appointments to
relatives of both donor and donee is also explored.
II. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY APPLICATIONS
OF ANTILAPSE STATUTUES
A. Development of Survival Requirement
It was determined in Oke v. Heath,'5 decided by Lord Hardwicke
in 1748, that an appointee must survive the donee to take under a
power exercised by will. In that case, the donee exercised a special
15. 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748).
409
Washington Law Review
power to appoint to her kin in favor of a nephew who predeceased
her. The nephew's successors claimed the appointive property, argu-
ing that prior to death the nephew held some form of future interest in
the property which would vest on exercise of the power. Like a re-
mainder conditioned to vest on an event other than survival, they
claimed, the appointee's interest should vest in the appointee, if living,
and otherwise in his successors, on occurrence of the condition. The
competing claimant argued to the contrary that the interest of the ap-
pointee prior to the appointment was not an interest in property at all,
but was a mere expectancy which could not ripen into a property in-
terest unless the holder was living when the power was exercised. 16
The court rejected the argument that a potential appointee's inter-
est is a property interest and held that the nephew had only an
expectancy which lapsed on his death prior to exercise of the power.
The court reasoned as follows:
She has executed her power by will .... The whole frame is testamen-
tary ... ; and although this arises out of her power to make a will, and
it is a general notion of law as to powers, that any taking under the di-
rections of the will, take under the power, in the same manner as if
their names were inserted there; yet they must take according to the
nature of the power and the instrument taken together .... [S] he exe-
cuting her power by will, it must be construed to all intents like a will;
the conditions of which are, that it is ambulatory, revocable, and in-
complete till her death; nor can any one dying in the testator's life,
take under it. 17
Two years later, another attempt was made to persuade Lord
Hardwicke that an appointee under a power exercised by will ac-
quired an interest in the appointive property prior to the death of the
donee. In Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin,18 the argument
was based on the "relation back" theory.19 Under this theory, a trans-
fer effected by exercise of a power of appointment is deemed to have
only one operative donative act, the act of the donor in creating the
power. The donee is seen merely as the donor's agent, who serves to
"fill the blanks" left in the creating instrument by the donor. When
16. The competing claimant was the donee's residuary legatee, a niece of the donee.
Id. at 940.
17. Id. at 942.
18. 28 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ch. 1750).
19. Id. at 52.
410
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the blanks are filled, the transfer becomes complete, but its operative
date is related back to the date of the creating instrument.2 0 This the-
ory has been used, for example, to conclude that the period for deter-
mining compliance with the Rule Against Perpetuities is measured
from the date of the creating instrument.21 Applied to the creation of
the appointee's interest, relation back would vest the interest as of the
date the power was created.
This attempt Was no more successful than the remainder analogy
argued in Oke v. Heath. While Lord Hardwicke accepted the theory
of relation back as an explanation for other aspects and consequences
of powers, he rejected it for this purpose.22 He reasoned that even
though the appointee's interest would be read back into the creating
instrument, if the execution of the power was by will, nothing could
vest until the will became effective. Because the act necessary to com-
plete the transfer to the appointee was testamentary, the requirements
for taking by will must be met, and because of the ambulatory nature
of a will, it could have no effect until its maker died.23 Thus, a testa-
mentary appointee could take the property only by claiming under
both the creating instrument and the will which exercised the power;
that is, the appointee was required to survive the death of the donee.24
This requirement of survival was never again seriously challenged. 25
B. English Antilapse Statute and Cases
The English antilapse statute was enacted as section 33 of the Wills
Act of 1837.26 In substance, section 33 provides that if a devise or be-
20. See 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY V 387 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1977); SIMES &
SMITH. supra note 8, § 423.
21. This is the rule with respect to special powers and is the majority rule in the
United States for general testamentary powers. Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill.
256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITES § 526.2 (4th
ed. 1942); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 20, 1 387; SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, §§ 127 1-
1277.
In contrast to this, the English cases and a minority of American courts hold that
the rule runs from the time of exercise in the case of all general powers. See, e.g.,In-
dustrial Nat'l Bank v. Barnett, 101 R.I. 89, 220 A.2d 517 (1966); Rous v. Jackson, 29
Ch. D. 521 (Ch. 1885); A. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDI-
TIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS § 695, at 794 (1920).
22. 28 Eng. Rep. at 52.
23. Id. at 52-53.
24. Southby v. Stonehouse, 28 Eng. Rep. 389, 390 (Ch. 1755) (Hardwicke, L.C.).
25. But cf. Vandersee v. Aclom, 31 Eng. Rep. 399, 404 (M.R. 1799) (party
argued inapplicability of Oke v. Heath on similar facts).
26. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 26, § 33. Section 33 provides:
411
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quest is made to a lineal descendant of the testator and that descend-
ant dies before the testator, leaving issue surviving at the time of the
testator's death, there should be no lapse. The property so devised or
bequeathed should pass as if the named taker had died immediately
after the testator, rather than before.27
The first case to consider whether this statute might be applied to a
predeceased appointee under a power exercised by will was Griffiths
v. Gale,28 decided in 1844. In Griffiths, the donee exercised an exclu-
sive special power2 9 in favor of one of several permissive takers, and
the appointee died shortly before the donee, leaving children surviv-
ing. 30 The court held that the antilapse statute did not apply to save
the appointment, reasoning that an appointment was not a "devise" or
"bequest" which could "lapse":
[F] or where property is disposed of by virtue of a power, there is no
lapse; the property goes over to specified objects, not by virtue of the
intention of the donee of the power who has no control over the prop-
erty, but by virtue of the previous directions of the donor. The term
"lapse" shews that the Legislature was speaking of a thing that might
lapse: it shews that the Legislature was speaking of devises and be-
quests properly so called; that is, of dispositions of property of which
the testator was owner.31
Although Griffiths involved a special power, the court's decision
IW) here any Person being a Child or other Issue of the Testator to whom any
Real or Personal Estate shall be devised or bequeathed for any Estate or Interest
not determinable at or before the Death of such Person shall die in the Lifetime
of the Testator leaving Issue, and any such Issue of such person shall be living
at the Time of the Death of the Testator. such Devise or Bequest shall not lapse.
but shall take effect as if the Death of such Person had happened immediately
after the Death of the Testator. unless a contrary Intention shall appear by the
Will.
27. Thus the English statute differs from most American antilapse statutes insofar
as it does not pass the property directly to issue of the predeceased taker, but rather
passes it as if the named taker had died immediately after the testator. Sce Table at
408 supra.
28. 59 Eng. Rep. 1168 (Ch. 1844).
29. Under an exclusive special power, the donee may exclude one or more of the
objects in making the appointment. SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 879.
30. The argument to the court centered on the question whether the words "lapse."
"'devise," and "'bequest." used in the antilapse statute, were intended to include appoint-
ments made by will. From the report of the case. it appears that the argument made
by the appointee's administrator was based entirely on other sections of the Wills Act
which, he claimed, showed that the words -lapse." "'devise." and "'bequest- were in-
tended in § 33 to include testamentary appointments. 59 Eng. Rep. at 1169. No
reference to the language and holding of Oke v. Heath appears in the case.
31. 59 Eng. Rep. at 1170.
412
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did not turn on the nature of the power. In Eccles v. Cheyne,32 de-
cided in 1856, the parties raised the issue whether the antilapse stat-
ute applied to an appointment attempted under a general power. The
donee in that case exercised her general power of appointment by will
in favor of two daughters, one of whom predeceased her. The de-
ceased daughter's representative and the takers in default of
appointment both claimed the appointive assets.33
Section 27 of the Wills Act of 183734 provides that a general devise
or bequest in a will shall be construed to include property over which
the testator had a general power of appointment, thus exercising the
power.35 Accordingly, the court in Eccles v. Cheyne held that the ex-
ercise of a general power by will was a "devise" or "bequest" which
could "lapse" within the meaning of section 33. It distinguished Grif-
fiths v. Gale on the ground that Griffiths involved a special power
which was not covered by section 27.36 The court indicated in dictum
an even narrower ground for the decision in Griffiths: the power there
allowed appointment only to "children," and the persons who would
have taken had section 33 been applied were not permissible objects
of that power. 37
32. 69 Eng. Rep. 954 (Ch. 1856).
33. Interestingly, the takers in default argued both that the deceased daughter's
share "lapsed by reason of her death in the lifetime of the testatrix," and that the
word "lapse" in § 33 was "inapplicable to an appointment." Id. at 955.
34. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 26, § 27.
35. Section 27 reads in part as follows:
[A] general Devise of the Real Estate of the Testator, or of the Real Estate of
the Testator in any Place or in the Occupation of any Person mentioned in his
Will, or otherwise described in a general Manner. shall be construed to include
any Real Estate, or any Real Estate to which such Description shall extend . . .
which he inay hare power to appoint in any Manner he imay think proper, and
shall operate as an Execution of such Power, unless a contrary Intention shall
appear by the Will ....
Id. (emphasis added). The section contains a similar provision governing personal
property.
36. The court stated:
In Griffiths %'. Gale the power was not a general but a limited power. . . . The
power was not within the 27th section, which applies only to general powers-
powers "to appoint in any manner the appointor may think proper"-words which
clearly cannot extend to a power to appoint to children. . . . And as the power
was not within the 27th section, as under that section the property, the subject of
the appointment, would not have passed by a general bequest, the appointment
could not be saved from lapse by the 33d section, which applies only to property
which passes by bequest.
69 Eng. Rep. at 955.
37. "In Griffiths v. Gale the power was . . . a power to appoint to children, and
to children only; and it could never have been the intention of the Act to extend a
power, which in its creation was restricted to children, so as to include any persons
413
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The Eccles court noted the cases giving creditors access to property
subject to a general power, after the power has been exercised, as ad-
ditional support for its conclusion that the antilapse statute should be
applied. 38 Upon exercise of a general power, the donee is treated as
having the equivalent of absolute ownership of the property. 39 This is
consistent with treating the disposition of appointive assets under a
general power as a testamentary disposition of the donee's owned as-
sets.
The court in Eccles thus pointed out two bases upon which one
might justify treating appointments made under special and general
powers differently for purposes of applying the antilapse statute: first,
application of the statute to special powers might result in passing the
property to people who are not objects designated by the donor; sec-
ond, the unlimited selection of appointees gives the donee of a general
power an interest equivalent to absolute ownership for purposes of
making a testamentary disposition. Nonetheless, it rested its conclu-
sion primarily on its construction of the effect of section 27 of the
but children." Id.
This statement, coupled with the one which follows, indicates that the court was
somewhat ambivalent on the question whether § 33 could ever be applied in the ab-
sence of § 27:
The Legislature having, by the 27th section. extended the meaning of the word
"bequest" so as to include property appointed by the testator under a general
power, the word "lapse" in the 33d section should receive a corresponding exten-
sion of meaning. and be applicable to a legacy given by an appointment in exer-
cise of power. The only caution to be observed in applying the statute to the ex-
ercise of the power is not to extend its operation so as to include objects not
within the scope of a limited power.
Id. at 957. The final sentence is curious. If § 27 is the only basis for applying § 33.
the question of including objects not within the scope of a limited power could not
arise, as § 27 applies only to general powers.
Lord St. Leonards. too, failed to take a clear position on the applicability of § 33
if the statutory takers fell within the object class. In discussing these two cases, he
says only that
[ii n [ Griffiths 1. Gale] an erroneous view was taken of the general operation of
the statute; but as the power was confined to the particular objects the decision
was correct. Full effect was given to the words of the statute in Eccles v. Cheyne.
in which a general power was executed ....
E. SUGOEN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF POWERS 463 (8th ed. 1861) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original).
38. 69 Eng. Rep. at 956.
39. Id. This is often given as the rationale for allowing creditors access to ap-
pointive property when a general power has been exercised. See, e.g., Clapp v. Ingra-
ham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 945. Nevertheless, other
cases have explained the result as an intervention by equity to prevent injustice. See,
e.g., Gilman v. Bell, 99 Il1. 144, 151 (1881) ("when the appointee is a volunteer,
the court holds that he, by the appointment, endeavors to misapply his property to
defraud his creditors,-that he must be just before he is generous").
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Act. 40 In neither Eccles nor Griffiths did the court discuss the validity
of the distinction drawn between general and special powers in light
of the purpose underlying the antilapse statute.
The question raised, but not completely disposed of, in Eccles v.
Cheyne-the proper scope of Griffiths v. Gale-was taken up again
in 1881 by Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls. In Freme v. Cle-
ment,41 an appointment made pursuant to a special power was held
void for remoteness. 42 The broad issue was whether the appointive
property would pass under the residuary clause of the donee's will or
in default of appointment. Section 25 of the Wills Act of 1837 pro-
vides that real estate contained in any
Devise . . . which shall fail or be void by reason of the Death of the
Devisee in the Lifetime of the Testator, or by reason of such Devise
being contrary to Law, or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall
be included in the Residuary Devise (if any) contained in such Will.43
Thus, the question addressed by the court in Griffiths v. Gale was
again presented: whether exercise of a special power of appointment
by will could be considered a "devise."44
The Freme court concluded that exercise of a special power was a
"devise" within the meaning of section 25:
It must be remembered that, after all, every will is in exercise of a
power, not technically, but generally. It is a power given by the Legis-
lature to a man to direct what shall become of his property after his
death. It is a mere power; and indeed so much is it a power according
to the English law, that there was a time when a man did not possess
that power: it was given to him by statute. It is really a power of dis-
position, and it is a power of disposition which by this very statute is
extended.... When we speak of a "devise," we mean a devise which is
the exercise of a power of disposition given to a man either by the Act
of Parliament or by some person. Why should we restrict the meaning
of the word, if we find an intention to dispose of the property?45
The court suggested the basis of the cases refusing to apply the anti-
lapse statute, section 33, to appointments made under special powers
40. 69 Eng. Rep. at 957.
41. 18Ch. D. 499(M.R. 1881).
42. That is, the appointment violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
43. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict.. c. 26, § 25.
44. See note 30 sutpra.
45. 18 Ch. D. at 510.
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was not that exercise of a testamentary power was not a "devise" or
"bequest," but rather that in each such case application of section 33
would have resulted in passing the appointive property to persons
who were not objects of the power.46
The appellate court disapproved Freme v. Clement three years
later in Holyland v. Lewin,47 holding that the only possible basis for
applying the antilapse statute to an appointment made by will was
section 27 of the Act. Consequently, the antilapse statute could never
be applied to appointments under special powers, for they are not
covered by section 27. The court reasoned that exercise of a power by
will is not a testamentary act, for it does not come within the usual
meaning of the words "devise" or "bequest," and there was no reason
to suppose that Parliament had intended to change the common law
with respect to the operation of special powers. 48
Holyland v. Lewin settled the law in England that the antilapse
statute could apply only to an appointment made by exercise of a gen-
eral power.49 The basis for applying the statute was clearly held to be
the language of section 27 of the Wills Act of 1837, which provides
that a general devise should be construed to include property over
which the testator had a general power of appointment. The court did
not adopt the suggestion made in Eccles v. Cheyne50 that by exercis-
ing a general power the donee became the equivalent of an owner of
the appointive property. Nor did the court accept the analysis of Sir
George Jessel in Freme v. Clement that exercise of a power of ap-
pointment by will is as much a testamentary disposition of property as
any devise or bequest of property owned by the donee. Nowhere in
the prevailing English case law is there any discussion of the policy
reasons for applying the antilapse statute to general powers and refus-
46. The court stated:
The 33rd section is not so clear: in fact. it has been held not to apply to an ap-
pointment; but I take it that the decisions must be treated as founded really-
although they are not so in form-upon the fact of the section not applying
where the object of th [sic] power is not within it.
Id. at 514-15.
47. 26 Ch. D. 266 (Ch. App. 1884).
48. Id. at 271-73.
49. See 30 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 461 (3d ed. 1959); 39 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 880 n. (3d ed. 1972); 2 T. JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 819
(7th ed. 1930); R. MEGARRY & H. WADE. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 491 (4th ed.
1975). Cf. Freeland v. Pearson, L.R. 3 Eq. 658, 663 (M.R. 1867) (Griffiths settled
inapplicability of § 33 to special powers).
50. See text accompanying notes 38 & 39 supra.
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ing to apply it to special powers. The approach the English courts set-
tled on stems solely from an interpretation of the words "devise," "be-
quest," and "lapse" used in section 33, a technical solution at best.
C. The American Authorities
In the United States, these English authorities have generally been
followed, but the grounds for applying antilapse statutes to test-
amentary appointments have been more broadly stated.
1. Appointments under general powers
The first American case to consider applying an antilapse statute to
a "lapsed" appointment was Lyndall's Estate,51 which was decided in
Pennsylvania in 1893 and involved a general power. The Pennsylvania
statutes included a provision, modeled after section 27 of the English
Wills Act, 52 providing that a general devise or bequest should be con-
strued to include property subject to a general power of appointment. 53
Citing Eccles v. Cheyne,5 4 the court held that, because of this provision,
the antilapse statute would be applied to preserve the appointment for
the issue of the predeceased appointee.
The court did not rely solely on the reasoning of the English court,
however, but added:
The hardship and mischief designed to be remedied by the acts pre-
venting the lapse or failure of bequests or devises to children, brothers
or sisters, or their issue, in case of death in the lifetime of the testator,
are precisely the same, whether the property is disposed of under a
general power or by an ordinary will; and the acts, therefore, must be
construed as applying to both cases alike in the absence of language
excluding such construction. 55
The court here seems to have followed the same track as Sir George
Jessel in Freme v. Clement,56 that exercise of a testamentary power is
51. 2 Pa. D. 476 (1893).
52. Id. at 477. Section 27 is quoted at note 35 supra.
53. Cf. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2514(13) (Purdon 1975) (current statute).
54. 69 Eng. Rep. 954 (Ch. 1856). See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
55. 2 Pa. D. at 477.
56. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
417
Washington Law Review
essentially the same for the purpose of the antilapse statute as a dispo-
sition of owned assets. 57
The next case to take up the question, commonly cited as the lead-
ing case,58 was Thompson v. Pew,59 decided in Massachusetts in
1913. In Thompson, the donee of a general power attempted to exer-
cise it in favor of her brother who predeceased her leaving issue. Al-
though Massachusetts had no statute comparable to section 27 of the
English Wills Act, its case law had established that a residuary clause
would exercise a general power of appointment. 60 The court applied
the antilapse statute to preserve the appointment for the appointee's
issue, reasoning that, because the power was general, the testatrix's
power of disposition over the appointive assets was the same as over
her own property. In support of its decision, the court cited the cases
holding that a general residuary clause would exercise a general
power and cases upholding the power of a donee's creditors to reach
appointive property after exercise of such a power. 61 Both lines of
cases are based on similarities between outright ownership and a gen-
eral power.
In four American jurisdictions there are cases holding that an anti-
lapse statute applies to an appointment under a general testamentary
power.62 In all but one, such a power is exercised by a general devise,
bequest, or residuary clause.63 This has led at least one commentator
to suggest that in a jurisdiction where the opposite rule is followed,
57. Although Sir George Jessel apparently would have applied this reasoning to
limited or special powers. see 18 Ch. D. at 507. 510-12. the Pennsylvania court in
Lyndal's E.tate applied it only to general powers. 2 Pa. D. at 478.
58. See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.47. at 586 n.8 (AJ. Casner ed.
1952); SIMEs & SMITH..supra note 8. § 984.
59. 214 Mass. 520. 102N.E. 122(1913).
60. Stone v. Forbes. 189 Mass. 163, 75 N.E. 141 (1905); Amory v. Meredith.
89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397 (1863).
61. Massachusetts follows the general rule that creditors of the donee of a general
power can reach appointive assets only after an exercise of the power. Olney v. Balch.
154 Mass. 318. 28 N.E. 258 (1891); Clapp v. Ingraham. 126 Mass. 200 (1879).
62. See Newton v. Bullard. 181 Ga. 448. 182 S.E. 614 (1935). Thompson v. Pew.
214 Mass. 520. 102 N.E. 122 (1913); In re Estate of Sears. 29 Misc. 2d 234. 215
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1961); In re Goodman, 155 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1956); In re Beau-
mont's Estate, 147 Misc. 118, 263 N.Y.S. 426 (1933); Newlin Estate, 72 Pa. D. & C.
446 (1950); Rowland's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 477 (1932); Lyndall's Estate, 2 Pa. D.
476 (1893).
63. Georgia is the only one of these jurisdictions in which a general devise, be-
quest. or residuary clause will not be deemed to exercise a general power. See May v.
Citizens & S. Bank, 233 Ga. 614, 157 S.E.2d 279 (1967), and cases cited therein.
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the antilapse statute would not be applied.64 Such a result would be
consistent with the English courts' position that the exercise of a
powerof appointment is not a "devise" or "bequest" in the absence of
a statute specifically making it such.65
The Restatement of Property rejects this basis for applying anti-
lapse statutes to appointments under general powers.66 Instead, it em-
64. H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §. 365, at 496
(1941).
Statutes in 26 jurisdictions address the question whether a general devise, bequest,
or residuary clause will be deemed to exercise a power of appointment in the ab-
sence of an express reference thereto. Eleven call for exercise: CAL. CIv. CODE § 1386.2
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE § 18-303 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.060
(Baldwin 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43 (1976); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 10-6.1 (McKinney 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 164 (West 1970); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2514(13) (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-17 (1969); S.C.
CODE § 21-7-430 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-11-45, -60 (1967);
VA. CODE § 64.1-67 (1973). Four states provide generally for exercise only in the
absence of a gift in default of appointment. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-407
(1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 556.114-.116 (1970); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-6 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 702.03(2) (West 1977).
A number of states have adopted UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-6 10, which espouses
a contrary rule:
A general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of all
of the testator's property, does not exercise a power of appointment held by the
testator unless specific reference is made to the power or there is some other
indication of intention to include the property subject to the power.
See ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.265 (1972); Aiz. REV. STAT. § 14-2610 (1975); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-610 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.607 (West 1976); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2-610 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
524.2-610 (West 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-2-610 (1975); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-2348 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-610 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-09-10 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.410 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-610
(1977).
Massachusetts cases have held since 1863 that a residuary clause exercises a gen-
eral power. Amory v. Meredith, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397 (1863); see Annot., 15
A.L.R. 3d 346, 357 (1967). The Massachusetts rule has been followed in New Hamp-
shire. Emery v. Haven, 67 N.H. 503, 35 A. 940 (1894). The New Hampshire hold-
ing is in doubt, due to a subsequent case which refused to apply the Massachusetts
rule, yet did not refer to Emery. See Faulkner v. Faulkner, 93 N.H. 451, 44 A.2d
429 (1945).
The majority rule in the absence of statute is that there is no exercise. RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 343 (1940).
65. See Holyland v. Lewin, 26 Ch. D. 266 (Ch. App. 1884); text accompanying
notes 47-48 supra.
66. It states:
Statutes commonly provide in substance that, if a devisee or legatee bearing
a stated relationship to the testator (rarely, any devisee or legatee without re-
gard to relationship) predeceases the testator the property devised or bequeathed
passes to any issue of the devisee or legatee surviving the testator (rarely, to the
heirs of the devisee or legatee) unless a contrary intent is manifested. Where
property is appointed by will under a general power such statutes apply as if
such property were owned by the donee and devised or bequeathed by him.
Caveat: The Institute takes no position as to the applicability of statutes of
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phasizes the similarity between the interest of the donee of a general
power and that of an owner of property:
The statutes referred to in this Section are designed to prevent the
failure of testamentary gifts by lapse in situations where it seems
probable that it would have been desired to pass the gift to the family
of the named recipient if his death had been foreseen. In terms such
statutes apply to "devises and legacies" by "testators," words which
are technically inappropriate to describe appointments by donees of
powers. Yet the donee of a general power is in a position so closely
analogous to that of an owner of property and a testamentary appoint-
ment by him to a person who predeceases him is so closely analogous
to a devise of owned property to such a person that the application of
the statutes is extended to cover this situation. 67
Another ground for applying antilapse statutes to appointments
made under general powers is that antilapse statutes are designed to
carry out the presumed intent of a person disposing of property at his
death. This analysis is stated in the American Law of Property:
[T] he lapse statute prescribes a gift in substitution on the assumption
that the testator would have so intended had his attention been drawn
to the situation. It may well be supposed that the testator would have
intended such a gift in substitution whether his power to make the gift
was derived from his ownership of the property in question or from a
power of appointment over it. Accordingly the statute, although
phrased in terms of devises and bequests of owned interests, is not,
when construed with reference to its supposed purpose, confined
within the niceties of its phrasing. Thus it operates even though the at-
tempted gift was by the exercise of a power of appointment rather
than by the devise or bequest of an owned interest. 68
While the American cases are not numerous, 69 it seems settled that
antilapse statutes can be applied to appointments made pursuant to
general testamentary powers, even in the absence of statutory or case
law specifically providing that property subject to a general power is
deemed to be included in, a general devise or bequest. The American
the type described to powers and appointments other than appointments by will
by the donee of a general power.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 350 (1940) (italics in original).
67. Id. § 350, Comment a.
68. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.47, at 587 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
69. See cases cited at note 62 supra.
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courts have not relied on the technical statutory analysis of the En-
glish courts, but rather have looked to the substance of the transaction
and to the purpose of the antilapse statutes in reaching their decisions.
2. Appointments under special powers
Even fewer American cases deal with the question whether anti-
lapse statutes may be applied to appointments under special powers
than deal with their applicability under general powers. Only three
such cases have been reported.
The most recent case is Dow v. Atwood,70 decided in 1969 by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The donor's will gave his wife a life
estate, "after which, it is my wish that she give, bequeath and devise
the same to my brother, Alfred L. Atwood, to him and his heirs for-
ever."71 The court construed this language as creating a special power
of appointment. Although the wife's will exercised the power in favor
of Alfred, he predeceased her leaving children who survived the wife.
The Maine antilapse statute substitutes lineal descendants for a pre-
deceasing devisee who is related to the testator.72 Because Alfred was
not related to the wife, the court held that the statute could not be ap-
plied.73 Although the court indicated some doubt whether an
antilapse statute could be applied to an appointment under a special
power in any event,74 its resolution made it unnecessary to decide the
point. Nor did the court decide whether the issue could be substituted
under a power which was to appoint only to Alfred.
70. 260 A.2d 437 (Me. 1969).
71. Id. at 439.
72. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1008 (1964).
73. The only authority cited by the court in support of its conclusion is SIMES &
SMITH, supra note 8, § 984, discussed at text accompanying note 97 infra.
74. The court's statement is curious: "As we have seen, the power to appoint to
Alfred was special and not general. Thus the rule that a general power of appoint-
ment may be considered a property interest passing under an anti-lapse statute is not
applicable." 260 A.2d at 441.
The question, of course, is not whether the power passes, but whether the appoin-
tive property can be considered to pass by a devise of the donee. The statement may
merely be careless; however, the court went on to state: "Under a testamentary spe-
cial power the appointee takes from the donee and not from the donor of the power."
Id. The latter statement appears flatly to contradict the principle of "relation back,"
that title to the appointive property passes from the donor, not the donee, of a power,
particularly in the case of a special power. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
23.5, at 469 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 20, 387; SiMES &
SMITH, supra note 8, § 913, at 376; notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra. The
court's understanding of powers of appointment seems open to question.
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The latter question was specifically raised and decided in Daniel v.
Brown,75 a Virginia case decided in 1931. In that case, the donee held
a testamentary power to appoint property to her husband's nephews
and nieces. She exercised it in favor of three nieces and nephews, fur-
ther providing for the substitution of their issue in the event any of
them predeceased her. All three appointees predeceased the wife, one
leaving issue surviving her. The surviving nieces and nephews, to
whom no appointment was made, claimed the property as implied
takers in default. The court held the appointment ineffective, despite
the antilapse provision of the will and the antilapse statute,76 because
the substituted takers were not within the class of objects designated
by the donor:
A stream can rise no higher than its source, and the source of au-
thority here denies to Jane C. Jackson the power to leave this property
to anyone except the nieces and nephews of her husband. Clearly, Jo-
seph S. Jackson provided a different disposition than to leave his
property to the issue of his nieces and nephews, by the very require-
ments of his will grandnieces and grandnephews were eliminated.77
While the court did not discuss whether an antilapse provision might
ever be applied to an appointment under a special power, it did indi-
cate that had this been a general power, it would have applied it, fol-
lowing Thompson v. Pew.78
Whether an antilapse statute can be applied to an appointment
under a special power was raised in Grubb's Estate,79 a Pennsylvania
case decided in 1939. The donee had a power to appoint to her de-
scendants, or if she had none, to the donor's descendants. Having no
descendants, she exercised the power by her will in favor of the do-
nor's grandchildren, one of whom predeceased her leaving issue sur-
viving.
75. 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931).
76. VA. CODE § 5238(1919).
77. 159 S.E. at 210.
78. The court surmised:
If the power had been general in the donee to select the object of the bounty
and the donee of the power had exercised her discretion, and the devisees named
by her had died prior to her death then section 5238 would have prevented the
lapse of such devises in favor of the issue. This was the holding in the case of
Thompson v. Pew, 214 Mass. 520, 102 N.E. 122.
Id.
79. 36 Pa. D. &C. I (1939).
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The case was first adjudicated by a single "auditing judge. °80 He
treated it as a case of first impression in the United States, 81 reviewed
the English authorities,82 and distinguished them on the ground that
the English antilapse statute does not identify a class of substitute tak-
ers (such as issue), but rather passes the property to those who would
be the appointee's successors, as of the moment after the donee's
death, whoever they might be.83 Thus the danger of bringing in one
not a member of the class of objects is much greater in England. He
went on to approve a position which he attributed to Sir George Jes-
sel,84 that the possibility of one not a member of the class claiming
under the antilapse statute should not preclude claims from those who
do fall within the class:
[T] here is no need to deny those who are within the limits of a special
power the benefits of the lapse provision merely because someone not
within the limited class might seek to invoke it; when that case arises
we need merely say that in special powers the lapse statute may only
be applied when it will operate to substitute a person within the class
limited.85
The judge ruled that Pennsylvania's antilapse statute applied to pre-
serve the appointment to the deceased grandchild's issue.86
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned, first, that within
the limit of permissible appointees the donee's power of disposition
over appointive assets is the same as a power of disposition over
owned assets at death; both are essentially testamentary dispositions.
Second, the antilapse statute is a canon of construction, providing a
legislative presumption of intent to make a substitutional gift where
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 5-7. The opinion takes note of Freme v. Clement, 18 Ch. D. 499
(M.R. 1881); Griffiths v. Gale, 59 Eng. Rep. 1168 (Ch. 1844); Holyland v. Lewin,
26 Ch. D. 266 (Ch. App. 1884).
83. The English statute is quoted at note 26 supra.
84. 36 Pa. D. & C. at 6. The language to which the judge apparently referred
reads:
The 33rd section ... has been held not to apply to an appointment; but I take
it that the decisions must be treated as founded really-although they are not so
in form-upon the fact of the section not applying where the object of th [sic]
power is not within it. But the point has yet to be decided whether that section
does not apply to powers of appointment (in cases where an appointment would
be warranted), such as general powers, and perhaps some special powers.
Freme v. Clement, 18 Ch. D. 499, 514-15 (M.R. 1881).
85. 36 Pa.D. &C. at 6.
86. Id. at 7-8.
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no contrary intention appears in the will. Because the two types of
dispositions are essentially the same, the legislative presumption of in-
tent should apply equally to appointments effected by will as to dev-
ises or bequests.87 Thus, by stressing both the similarity of an appoint-
ment to a disposition of owned property and the presumptive intent of
testators upon which the antilapse statute rests, the court wove
together the two analyses reflected in the Restatement of Property88
and the American Law of Property.89
The Orphans' Court affirmed the decision, 90 holding that, for this
purpose, there is no fundamental difference between general and spe-
cial powers. In each case, the donee is exercising a power of disposi-
tion by will over property which is not owned by the donee, but the
disposition is essentially testamentary. 91
3. American statutes
Three states-California, Michigan, and Wisconsin-have enacted
statutes providing that their antilapse statutes apply to appointments
made by will.92 These statutes all resolve the question whether a dis-
tinction should be drawn between appointments under general and
special powers by rejecting the distinction. The statutes also resolve
two other questions which arise in applying antilapse statutes to testa-
mentary appointments: whether the statute can be applied if the pre-
deceasing appointee's issue are not objects of the power; and whether
the statute can be applied if the appointee is related to the donor but
not to the donee of the power. The statutes answer both questions in
the negative. California's statute is representative:
If an appointment by will or instrument effective only at the death of
the donee is ineffective because of the death of an appointee before
the appointment becomes effective, the appointment is to be effectu-
ated, if possible, by applying [the antilapse statute] as though the ap-
87. Id. at 7.
88. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
90. 36 Pa. D. &C. at 8.
91. Id. at 8-10.
92. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1389.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MicH. COMP. LAWS §
556.130 (1970); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West 1971). The Minnesota and New
York revisions have no such provision.
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pointive property were the property of the donee except that the prop-
erty shall pass only to persons who are permissible appointees.9 3
These statutes received almost no comment prior to enactment
even though all were adopted as the result of law revision commission
studies and recommendations. 94 The balance of this article discusss
the validity of the choices made and concludes with a recommenda-
tion that these statutes should be amended to expand their coverage.
III. THREE PROBLEMS ANALYSED
A. Application to Special Powers
English courts have refused to apply the antilapse statute to ap-
pointments under special powers on the ground that exercise of such a
power is not a "devise" or "bequest" within the meaning of the statute.
The dearth of authority leaves the question open in the United States.
Principal American commentators are divided on the question.
Powel 95 and the Restatement of Property96 take no position on the
question. Simes and Smith take the position that antilapse statutes
probably should not be applied to appointments under special powers
because
[1] apse statutes are designed to effectuate the purpose of the testator
(who, in these cases, is the donee of the power). But the purpose of
93. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1389.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). See also MICH. CoMP.
LAWS § 556.130 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.27 (West 1971).
94. See 9 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES
302(1969); [1966] MICH. LAW REVISION COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 5-6.
The California Law Revision Commission's report, which resulted in California's
statutory changes, was based on a study by Richard R.B. Powell; the Wisconsin
statute was passed in response to a project led by Richard W. Efflund. See Powell,
Powers of Appointment in California, 19 HASTINGS LJ. 1281 (1968), reprinted in 9
CAL. LAW REVISION CoMM'N, supra at 335; Effiund, Powers of Appointment-The
New Wisconsin Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 583; Effilund, Status Report on the Bar Re-
search Project on Revision of the Property Statutes, Wis. B. BULL., December 1962,
at 22. A study was done in Michigan by Olin L. Browder. See 0. BROWDER, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT, STUDY OF MICHIGAN STATUTES ON POWERS OF APPOINTMENT (1967),
cited in Powell, supra at 1293 n.76.
The comment on § 1389.4 of the California statute cites the comparable Michigan
provision, stating that the section "embodies the theory of Sections 349 and 350 of
the Restatement of Property" and that the section is needed because the antilapse
statute "does not specifically deal with lapse of a testamentary appointment." 9 CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra at 327.
95. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 20, 399, at 378.58-.59.
96. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 350 (1940) (caveat quoted at note 66 supra).
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special powers is to carry out the wishes of the donor by giving the do-
nee a personal discretion for the benefit of a particular class. And the
lapse statute is not designed to aid in effectuating the purposes of the
donor. 97
The American Law of Property takes the opposite point of view. 98
Because one reason for applying the antilapse statute is to carry out the
presumed intent of the donee, who, had she anticipated the appointee's
time of death, presumably would have substituted the appointee's issue,
then
it is irrelevant that the range of permissible appointees was limited by
the donor who created the power, and the statute should operate to ef-
fect a gift in substitution to the extent that such a gift was within the
power of the donee....
A lapse statute should operate if the person named by statute as
substitute taker is within the group of permissible appointees, no mat-
ter how wide or how narrow that group happens to be.99
The position taken by the court in Grubb's Estateoo and by the
American Law of Property has more to commend it than that taken
by Simes and Smith or the English courts. Under either a special or a
general power, the donee is given the power to make what is essen-
tially a testamentary disposition of the appointive property. Although
technically this may not be a testamentary disposition, as a practical
matter it is a disposition brought about by an instrument which has no
effect until the death of its maker.
Lapse problems usually arise because of the normal time lag be-
tween execution of such instruments and their effective dates, accom-
panied by failure to foresee in the drafting the events which actually
occur and failure or inability to change the instruments after a change
in circumstances.10 1 Whether the instrument disposes of property
97. SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 984.
98. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.47 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
99. Id. § 23.47, at 587-88.
100. 36 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1939). See text accompanying notes 79-91 supra.
101. See Becker, Future Interests and the Myth of the Simple Will: An Approach
to Estate Planning, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 665; Chaffin, The Time Gap in Wills:
Problems under Georgia's Lapse Statutes, 6 GA. L. REV. 268 (1972); 26 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 105 (1969).
As stated by one court:
The rule as to the lapsing of devises and legacies that prevailed before the
statute defeated, in most cases, the intention of the testator. He generally made
his will with reference to the objects of his bounty as they existed at the time,
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owned by the testator or of property over which he has only a power
of appointment, the difficulty is the same: unforeseen events make the
plan set forth by the testator impossible to fulfill, and there is no indi-
cation of what the testator would have wished had he known of the
events which in fact occurred. When the disposition is made to certain
classes of people, usually relatives, legislatures have judged that most
testators would have preferred the issue of the predeceased taker over
others who might claim the property. 102 No reason appears to explain
why this judgment as to probable preference should be different de-
pending on whether the testator owned the property, had a general
power of appointment, or had a special power of appointment. If the
donee could, by express provision in the will, have provided the issue
as substitute takers of the property, in the absence of any express tes-
tamentary provision to the contrary there seems no reason why the
statutory substitute should not be supplied.
Assuming that the substitute takers are permissible objects of the
power, the position taken by Simes and Smith1 03 is hard to defend.
There is no reason to suppose, because the donor's scheme embraced
the possibility that the takers under the statute would have been ap-
pointees, that applying an antilapse statute will upset the donor's
probable intent. On the contrary, any policy which tends to further
the donee's purpose, within the limits defined by the donor, should
also further the donor's intent, given the donor's delegation of discre-
tion to the donee.
The position of the-English courts 04 has more logic to support it.
If, indeed, the exercise of a power is not a devise or bequest, and the
statute must be construed strictly because it is in derogation of the
common law, their conclusion follows. This conclusion, however, ig-
nores the reality of the situation; in this context at least, the exercise
and as though his will took effect at the date of its execution, not apprehending
that a lapse would occur in case any of them should die before hinself, unless
some express disposition should be made in anticipation of such event. The
statute was passed to remedy such disappointments, and should receive a liberal
construction, so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. It . . .
provides that, where a devise is made to a child or other relative of the testator
who dies before the testator, the issue of such object of his bounty shall take the
portion devised to such child or relative. Nothing is more just and conformable
to the probable intention of the testator in every instance.
Woolley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599, 600 (1889).
102. In all but two of the American antilapse statutes, the issue of the predeceased
takers are substituted. See Table at p. 408 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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of a testamentary power is no different from a devise or bequest and
should be similarly treated.
In contrast to the approach taken by the English courts, American
courts have generally looked to the substance of the appointment
transaction rather than the technical meaning of the words used in the
antilapse statute.1 05 Applying this approach to the question whether
the statutes should be applied to appointments under special powers,
American courts should conclude that the statutes do apply. This re-
sult would be consistent with the three recent statutes on the subject,
all of which provide for application of the antilapse statute to ap-
pointments under special as well as general powers.106
B. Application to Expand the Class of Permissible Objects
A more difficult problem is posed where the objects of the special
power do not include the issue of the predeceased appointee. The re-
cently enacted statutes in California, Michigan, and Wisconsin1 07 all
provide that the antilapse statute cannot be applied if the substitute
takers are not within the class of permissible appointees of the power.
This position accords with the uniformly expressed views of courts
and commentators.' 08 All proceed on the assumption that to pass the
property to persons not within the class literally described by the do-
nor would do great violence to the donor's intent. As the Virginia
court pointed out in Daniel v. Brown,'0 9 when the donor creates a
power to appoint to nieces and nephews, she could not possibly have
intended their issue to take. Notwithstanding its logical appeal, this
position ignores the law developed in the analogous class gift cases.
When a gift is made by will to a class of persons and one or more of
them predeceases the testator, the question arises whether the anti-
lapse statute may be applied. Application of the statute results in pass-
ing the property to takers not literally described as class members by
the testator. This is precisely the problem posed by application of an-
tilapse statutes to appointments under a special power where the
105. See Part II-C supra.
106. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
107. See note 93 supra.
108. See Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931); Grubb's Estate,
36 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1939); 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.47 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 20, 399, at 378.59; SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8,
§ 984. Accord, Freme v. Clement, 18 Ch. D. at 514-15.
109. 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931). See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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description of the objects of the power does not include the takers
who are substituted by the statute. Since there is so little case law on
this problem in the powers context, courts and legislators should look
to the law developed in the class gift cases. 110
Earlier decisions in the class gift area were troubled by the techni-
cal question whether there could be a "lapse" with a class gift so long
as one member of the class survived."' Because the survivor would
take all of the property, there would be no lapse in the ordinary sense.
These cases are analogous to the earlier struggles in determining
whether there could be a "lapse" with the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment. As with the powers cases, most authorities now hold that
there can be a lapse under a class gift even though there are surviving
members of the class.1" 2
A more difficult question is that of the testator's intent. When the
class description is used, it can be argued that the testator intended as
takers only those persons meeting the description used at the time of
his death. It is more difficult than with a gift to a named individual to
conclude that the testator would have preferred the issue of the de-
ceased class member over the surviving members of the class. Con-
versely, it can be argued that the testator is no more likely to have
anticipated the possibility that a member of the class might prede-
cease him than that a named individual might. Where the class desig-
nation is used, the testator's purpose may have been only to provide
for possible increase in class membership or to economize on words.
From use of a class designation alone it is not realistically possible to
ascertain whether or not the testator intended to preclude the issue
from taking.
Because no reliable indicator of the testator's actual intent is avail-
able,1" 3 the policy favoring equality of distribution among branches
110. Well over 100 cases directed to this question are collected and discussed in
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957). Since 1957 the following cases have been decided:
Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Veal v. King, 216 Ga.
298, 116 S.E.2d 223 (1960); In re Estate of Evans, 193 Neb. 437, 227 N.W.2d 603
(1975); Gianoli v. Gabaccia, 82 Nev. 108, 412 P.2d 439 (1966); Wilson v. Smith, 47
Tenn. App. 194, 337 S.W.2d 456 (1960). See also Cooley, Lapse Statutes and Their
Effect on Gifts to Classes, 22 VA. L. REV. 373 (1936).
111. See, e.g., Trenton Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Sibbits, 62 N.J. Eq. 131, 49
A. 530 (Ch. 1901). See also Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948, 953-56 (1957).
112. Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948, 950 (1957). See, e.g., In re Steidl's Estate, 89
Cal. App. 2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948); Drafts v. Drafts 114 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959).
113. Antilapse statutes apply only in the absence of.anexpressed contrary intent.
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 92 (West 1956) ("unless an intent appears to substitute
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of the family has been used to tip the balance in favor of applying
antilapse statutes to class gifts.114 The rationale is stated in In re
Steidl's Estate:
[T] he statute was not solely for the purpose of preventing intestacy but
was enacted to substitute descendants of a deceased legatee, since ex-
perience has shown that by reason of neglect and failure to anticipate
the death of the primary legatee before the death of the testator the
latter often failed to provide for such contingency. . . .A technical
construction will defeat the object of the statute and will result in a
discrimination against the descendants of one member of a class in fa-
vor of the descendants of another. Such discrimination should not be
permitted unless it is manifest that such was the testator's intention.
... Such statutes are remedial and should receive a liberal construc-
tion.115
The same policy considerations should lead to applying antilapse
statutes to appointments under special powers even if the issue are not
within the description of the objects of the power. Here, too, no realis-
tic conclusion can be drawn from use of the class designation alone
that the donor intended to include or exclude the issue from taking in
the event a class member died before the donee. Arguments can be
made that the description means what it says, and that because the gift
is to be effective in the future the donor must have foreseen the possi-
bility that a class member would die leaving issue before the appoint-
ment. On the other side, however, it seems as likely that the donor did
not anticipate the death, and that had he done so, he would have pro-
vided for the substitution of issue.
In the situation involving a special power, the opportunities for
class members to die before the gift is effective are even greater than
with the usual class gift. The special power is often designed to be ex-
ercised at a point in time well after the donor's death. While this
another in his place"); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 22 (West Cum. Supp.
1977) ("unless a different disposition is made or required by the will"); N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 3-3.1 (McKinney 1967) ("unless the will provides other-
wise"); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2514 (Purdon 1975) ("In absence of a contrary
intent appearing therein, wills shall be construed ...."). The same result has been
reached where the statute contains no such language. In re Estate of Jackson, 106
Ariz. 82, 471 P.2d 278 (1970); Hay v. Dole, 119 Me. 421, 111 A. 713 (1920); In
re Estate of Allmond, 10 Wn. App. 869, 520 P.2d 1388 (1974).
114. Casner, Class Gifts-Effect of Failure of Class Members to Survive the
Testator, 60 HARV. L. REV. 751, 758-59 (1947). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY§ 298 &Comment a (1940); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948, 950 (1957).
115. 89 Cal. App. 2d 488, 201 P.2d 58, 63 (1948).
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might lead the drafter to a more careful consideration of possible fu-
ture events, it also expands the range of possibilities which may not
have been anticipated or provided for. The inferences that may be
drawn as to the donor's intent are simply too ambiguous to provide
the basis for a rational decision as to whether or not to apply the anti-
lapse statute.
The policy favoring equality of distribution among the branches of
a family should tip the balance in favor of applying antilapse statutes
to appointments under special powers as well as to class gifts. Al-
though the donor has given the donee the power to discriminate
among the various branches of the family, or among members of the
object class, the donor has shown no clear intent to limit the number
of branches among whom the power can be exercised. Because the
power is usually designed to permit flexibility in the ultimate disposi-
tion of the property by permitting the donee to take into account
changing family circumstances, applying the statute to permit the do-
nee to select not only among the primary class members but also
among the issue of those who are deceased may permit a more com-
plete effectuation of the donor's purpose. Unfortunately the published
literature does not reveal why the recent statutes specifically foreclose
the possibility of applying the antilapse statute in this circumstance;
they may simply follow the prevailing views of the authorities. On bal-
ance, it is submitted that antilapse statutes should be applied without
regard to whether the substitute takers are included within the permis-
sible appointees. The prevailing view should be reconsidered, and the
recent powers statutes should be amended.
C. Application to the Donor's Relatives
The purpose of antilapse statutes is to carry out the probable intent
of the testamentary transferor.1 16 If the testator has failed to provide
expressly for the devolution of property in the event the named taker
predeceases her, most statutes supply the issue of the predeceased
beneficiary as substitute takers, on the assumption that this carries out
the probable intent of the average testator. In the majority of states,
116. 6 W. BowF & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 50.10 (rev. ed. 1962); Chaffin,
supra note 101, at 271-72; 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105 (1969). Cf. Becker, Future
Interest and the Myth of the Simple Will, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 666 (assumed
decedent would not give to dead person).
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however, this imputation of preference for the issue of the prede-
ceased taker over the testator's residuary or intestate takers is con-
fined to the blood relatives of the testator.117
Most of the cases in the United States applying antilapse statutes to
testamentary appointments have involved appointments to a person
related to the donee. 118 Two cases, however, have raised the question
whether the antilapse statute could be applied to testamentary ap-
pointments made to persons related to the donor but not the donee. In
Dow v. Atwood,11 9 a donee appointed to her husband's brother under
a special testamentary power. In Rowland's Estate,120 the donee exer-
cised a general testamentary power in favor of her husband's nephew
and her own brother. In each case the husband was the donor of the
power.
In Dow, the court refused to apply the statute on the ground that
the husband's brother was not a relative of the wife. 121 In Rowland's
Estate, the court applied the statute to preserve the appointment to
the donee's brother's issue, but refused to apply it to the appointment
to her husband's nephew on the ground that he was not related to
her.122 In neither case did the court discuss the possibility that the
statute could be applied to an appointment to a relative of the donor.
The same result, that the antilapse statute applies only to appoint-
ments made to relatives of the donee, is to be expected under the
Michigan, Wisconsin, and California statutes.12 3 Although this result
seems generally accepted, 124 serious questions can be raised whether
it reflects any legitimate policy judgment. Is there any sense to apply-
ing the antilapse statute where the predeceased appointee is related to
the donee but refusing to apply it where the appointee is related only
to the donor?
117. See Table at p. 408 supra.
118. See cases cited at note 62 supra. All involved appointments to persons re-
lated to the donee. Although Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931),
involved a power to appoint to the donor's relatives, the Virginia antilapse statute
applies to any devisee. See Table at p. 408 supra.
119. 260 A.2d 437 (Me. 1969). See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
120. 17 Pa. D. & C. 477 (1932).
121. 260A.2dat441.
122. 17 Pa. D. & C. at 478, 480. The Pennsylvania lapse statute applies inter alia
to nephews and nieces of the testator. See note 12 supra.
123. See note 92 supra.
124. The court in Thompson v. Pew, 214 Mass. 520, 102 N.E. 122 (1913), stated:
The donee of a power to be exercised by will must be regarded as the testator
pro hac vice. Indeed, when the power is created by deed and is to be executed
by will, the donee is the only person who performs any testamentary act. It can
make no difference as to the nature of the power or the relation sustained by the
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1. General powers
The most common rationale articulated by the American authori-
ties for applying antilapse statutes to testamentary appointments is
that the holder of a general power has such a complete power of dis-
position over the appointive property that, for this purpose, the donee
should be treated as the owner of the property. 125 An uncritical exten-
sion of this analogy leads to the conclusion that, in applying the stat-
ute, the appointive property should be treated exactly like the donee's
owned property, with the result that an appointment to a predeceased
relative of the donor is not saved from lapse unless the appointee is
also related to the donee.
This analysis, however, ignores both the nature of a power of ap-
pointment and a purpose of the antilapse statutes. Although the donee
of a general testamentary power has a power of disposition at death as
broad as that held over property owned at the time of death, the do-
nee is not in fact the owner of the appointive assets. Prior to death,
the donee cannot convey or make a binding contract to transfer the
property; 126 in the absence of a contrary statute, the creditors of the
appointor to the appointee whether the power be created by deed or by will.
The appointor then is the testator; he is the person who makes the will, he, in the
absence of anything in the will to the contrary, and not the donor of the power
is the person whose relationship to the appointee is to be considered wherever
by statute or otherwise relationship between the person giving and the person
receiving by will is material.
102 N.E. at 123-24. Simes and Smith merely quote from this passage without fur-
ther discussion. SIMES & SMiTH, supra note 8, § 984, at 478.
Powell cites Rowland's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 477 (1932), and Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 29 N.E.2d 310 (1940), for the same proposition. 3 R.
POWELL, supra note 20, § 399, at 378.58 n.17. Old Colony, however, involved the
doctrine of capture. See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.61 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952). The court stated merely that the gift to the appointee lapsed and
that the appointment could not be saved by the lapse statute because the appointee
left no issue. The appointee and the donee were related, but no suggestion was made
that the donee is to be considered the sole testator under the statute. 29 N.E.2d at 311.
The American Law of Property states that the donee is the only "testator" within
the meaning of the antilapse statutes, because the donee was the person attempting
to make the gift. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.47, at 588 (AJ. Casner ed.
1952). Accord, Halbach, The Use of Powers of Appointment in Estate Planning, 45
IOWA L. REV. 691, 721 (1960).
125. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
126. This result is attributed to giving effect to the donor's intent. 5 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.35 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 20, §
395; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 340, Comment a (1940); SIMEs & SMITH, supra
note 8, § 1013. It would be ironic if the antilapse statute could not be extended to
protect the donor's relatives; no policy in favor of the donee's intent would be fur-
thered thereby, yet the donor's probable intent would be defeated.
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donee cannot reach the property; 127 any disposition of the property
cannot postpone vesting beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years
from the date the power was created.' 28 In the event the donee does
not exercise the power, the property will pass as specified by the do-
nor, or by intestacy from the donor. 129
Although the presumption of these antilapse statutes, that the sub-
stitution would be intended only for takers related to the testator, may
be accurate when applied to property owned by him, it seems unrea-
sonable when applied to appointive assets. Because the donee is aware
both of the origin of his power and of the fact that his capacity to deal
with the assets inter vivos is restricted, and because he has
affirmatively selected the appointee, it seems most likely that he
would hold an appointee related to the donor of the power in as much
affection as an appointee related to him, and thus would prefer the
appointee's issue to either his residuary takers' 30 or the takers in de-
fault.
Thus, although the donee of a general power holds an unlimited
power of disposition over the appointive assets at death, insistence on
applying the antilapse statute as if he were the owner of the appointive
assets is more likely to defeat the donee's intent than to carry it out.
The coverage of statutes providing for application of antilapse sta-
tutes to testamentary appointments should be extended to appointees
who are related to either the donor or the donee.
2. Special powers
When the appointment is made under a special power, the argu-
ment for applying the antilapse statute to substitute takers for a prede-
127. See note 3 supra.
128. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.34 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); J. GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 526.1-.3 (4th ed. 1942); R. LYNN, THE MODERN
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 124 (1966); J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES 141-42 (2d ed. 1962); see note 21 supra.
129. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.61 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952); R. POWELL,
supra note 20, 402; SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 103 1. In the words of the Re-
statement: "Where there is a general power and no gift in default of appointment in
specific language, property not appointed passes to the donor or his estate." RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 367(1) (1940).
130. Even though the particular appointment fails, the residuary clause will exer-
cise the power in a number of jurisdictions. See note 64 supra. In addition, the cap-
ture doctrine may also result in passing the appointive property by the donee's resid-
uary clause or to his intestate takers. See Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass. 144, 191 N.E.
360 (1934); SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 974.
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ceased relative of the donor, but not of the donee, is even more
compelling. In this situation, the donee has nothing approximating
ownership of the appointive asssets. As Simes and Smith have pointed
out, the donee merely has the discretion to make a selection among the
members of a group selected by the donor. 131 She is not entitled to
make any beneficial use of the power or the appointive property by
virtue of her power. 132
Under these circumstances, refusing to apply the antilapse statute
to prevent lapse of appointments to relatives of the donor, while ap-
plying it to prevent lapse of appointments to relatives of the donee,
seems absurd. That modern statutes 33 allow such a result is surely no
more than a legislative oversight. Those statutes should be amended
to broaden their protective coverage to include relatives of the donor
as well. Any new statutes on this subject should clearly so provide.
3. Preventing lapse by judicial decision when the appointee is
related only to the donor
Although the surest way to provide antilapse protection to the issue
of predeceased appointees who are related to the donor, but not to the
donee, is by statute, it may be possible to reach this result by construc-
tion of existing antilapse statutes. Antilapse statutes were not drawn
with the problems of powers of appointment in mind; they were drawn
in terms of a single "testator" who is predeceased by a devisee or lega-
tee leaving issue surviving. The basic problem in applying them to pro-
vide protection for relatives of the donor, of course, is applying the
word "testator" to the donor of the power.
The most obvious technical objection to doing so is that the word
"testator" in the statutes cannot be construed to apply to two different
persons. An argument that the term may be so construed can be made
based on the nature of the transaction. The transfer of property ef-
fected by exercise of a power of appointment is a two-step process. 34
131. SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 984, quoted at text accompanying note 97
supra.
132. An attempt to exercise a special power even indirectly to provide benefits to
the donee is a fraud on the power. Horne v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 91
(S.D. Cal. 1948); In re Carroll's Will, 274 N.Y. 288, 8 N.E.2d 864 (1937).
133. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.




The donor sets the basic frame of the disposition, determining the per-
sons who have interest in the property and creating a power in the do-
nee to shift some or all of those interests by exercise of the power. The
range of discretion given the donee in selecting the ultimate owners of
interests in the property is determined by the donor and may vary
from no discretion at all to discretion to select anyone, including the
donee. 135 To view the transfer as effectuated by the donative act of
only one or the other is to ignore the fact that two donative acts are
required to complete the transfer in the event the power is exercised.
It requires no great leap of logic to proceed from the two-step na-
ture of the transaction to the conclusion that both donor and donee
can be regarded as the "testator" for the purpose of determining who
is a "relative of the testator" within the meaning of the antilapse sta-
tutes. The analysis of the relationship between donor and donee
which views the donee as the agent of the donor to "fill in the blanks"
of the donor's dispositive scheme is useful here. 136 If the donee is
viewed as the donor's agent, it can be argued that, for this purpose at
least, the donee's will can be attributed to the donor, making the do-
nor the "testator." Because of the two-step nature of the transaction,
however, this analysis should not be taken so far as to conclude that
only the donor should be treated as the "testator."
An additional technical objection to construing antilapse statutes to
include the donor within the meaning of the word "testator" might be
raised where the power is created by inter vivos instrument rather
than by will, namely, that a donor of an inter vivos instrument cannot
be a "testator." Although the agency analysis should be sufficient to
counter such an objection, an additional argument could be based on
135. The range of discretion, of course, determines whether the power is general,
special, or hybrid. For definitions of general and special powers, see note 6 supra.
Hybrid powers are neither general nor special and arise predominantly from the fed-
eral estate and gift tax provisions that define a general power for tax purposes as
one "exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of
his estate," I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) (estate tax), or "exercisable in favor of the in-
dividual possessing the power . . .. his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate," I.R.C. § 2514(c) (gift tax). A power to appoint to anyone except donee.
creditors of donee, donee's estate, or the creditors of donee's estate is therefore not a
general power within the estate and gift tax codes, but it is not a special power either.
This is a typical hybrid power. SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 875. Because this
article takes the position that no distinction should be drawn between general and spe-
cial powers in applying antilapse statutes, no separate treatment has been accorded
hybrid powers.
136. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
436
Vol. 53: 405, 1978
Appointments Made by Will
In re Estate of Button.137 In that case the court applied an antilapse
statute to the interest of a beneficiary of an inter vivos trust. Its rea-
soning supports the position that the donor of a testamentary power
created by inter vivos instrument is included within the meaning of
the word "testator":
A gift to be enjoyed only upon or after the death of the donor is in
practical effect a legacy, whether it is created in an inter vivos instru-
ment or in a will. [The antilapse statute] declared the policy of the
law of [the State of Washington], and that policy is against the lapsing
of gifts to relatives of the deceased. This does not mean that a testator
or trustor cannot provide for a different disposition. If he does, of
course, the statute has no application.
Where a statute ... applied by its terms to devises of real estate, we
held that it declared the policy of the state applicable to a trust cover-
ing personal property as well .... By the same principle, there being
no conflicting statutory provision, a statute covering gifts by will
which would lapse in the absence of statute, applies to gifts provided
in a trust.'3 8
The policies behind preventing lapse of testamentary gifts to rela-
tives of the testator-preventing disappointment of expectations, pro-
viding equality among the branches of the family, and protecting issue
of predeceasing family members-apply equally to the relatives of the
donor and donee of the appointive property. In addition, it seems
most reasonable to presume that the donee's intent would be furthered
by substituting takers for the predeceased appointee, even if the ap-
pointee is related only to the donor. American courts have generally
rejected the technical approach employed by English courts and ap-
plied antilapse statutes to testamentary appointments, because, for
this purpose, they are substantially similar to other testamentary dis-
positions. It seems reasonable to hope they will conclude that the pro-
tection of the statutes should be extended to the donor's relatives.
IV. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
Courts can and should apply antilapse statutes to special powers as
137. 79 Wn. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971).
138. Id. at 854-55, 490 P.2d at 734 (1971). The court's analysis was unnecessary,
because the interest should have been construed to be without a condition of survival.
Fletcher, A Critical Note on Lapse, 8 GONZ. L. REV. 26 (1972).
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well as general powers, follow the class gift cases to substitute issue of
a predeceased appointee even when such issue are not included within
the class of permissible objects, and extend the protection of antilapse
statutes to relatives of the donor. The cases discussed above, however,
make it unlikely that they will all do so. Consequently, a statutory res-
olution of these problems would be desirable.
Statutes, if carefully drawn, present the following advantages: they
can provide a basis for sound planning by eliminating problems of
retroactivity and reliance; specify the scope of application of a rule
beyond a particular situation; preclude litigation otherwise necessary
to establish rules when there is no relevant common law authority;
and provide a basis for making the necessary arbitrary judgment as to
what most disposers of property would have intended had they fore-
seen the particular problem.
A statute designed to prevent the lapse of an appointment under a
testamentary special or general power might take the following form:
If the appointee of any power of appointment exercised by will,
who is related by consanguinity to either the donor or the donee of the
power, predeceases the donee of the power, leaving issue who survive
the donee, the surviving issue of such appointee shall take the ap-
pointed property, per stirpes and not per capita, in the same manner
as the appointee would have done had he survived the donee. The do-
nee of any special power, whether exercisable by will or by deed, shall
have the power to appoint to the issue of any object of the power who
predeceases the exercise of the power. The provisions of this statute
shall apply to any member of the class of objects of the power who was
alive at the date of the execution of the instrument creating the power,
or born thereafter, and shall apply to the issue of any object of the
power, even though such issue are not included within the description
of the objects of the power. Provided, however, that this statute shall
not apply if either the donor or the donee specifically manifests an in-
tent that some other disposition of the appointive property shall be
made.
This statute follows the majority of American jurisdictions in limit-
ing application of the antilapse statute to blood relatives of the testa-
tor,139 although relatives of both donor and donee are included. In
states where the antilapse statute is more broadly or narrowly applica-
139. See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
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ble, changes should be made to reflect the legislative judgment as to
the range of protection to be afforded by the statute.
The statute also follows the vast majority of American jurisdictions
in substituting issue for the predeceased taker.140 In those few juris-
dictions where the substitute takers are not limited to issue, considera-
tion should be given to providing separate treatment for general and
special powers. Because a principal justification for applying
antilapse statutes to class gifts is to preserve equality of distribution
among branches of a family,141 and a principal concern in applying
antilapse statutes to appointments under special powers should be to
adhere to the donor's probable intent,'4 limiting the substitution un-
der special powers to issue of the predeceasing object of the power
should be considered. For appointments under general powers, the
basic pattern of the jurisdiction's antilapse statute could be retained.
This statute, like other antilapse statutes, applies only in the ab-
sence of a manifestation of a contrary intent by the donor or donee of
the power.' 43 It is designed to fill the gap if there is no discernible in-
tent of the donor or donee as to the desired disposition of the property
when an intended taker predeceases the effective date of transfer.
Adoption of a statute such as the one suggested should resolve satis-
factorily the problems discussed herein without the costs and delays
incident to the adjudicatory process.
V. CONCLUSION
Development of American law on the proper application of anti-
lapse statutes to appointments made by will is in a rudimentary stage.
The little case law on the subject has followed the lead of the English
decisions in applying the statutes to appointments under general pow-
ers, but fortunately has not confined the grounds for decision to the
statutory basis used by the English courts. Because the problems cre-
ated by the death of an appointee are essentially the same as those
presented by the death of a devisee or legatee under a will, antilapse
statutes designed to resolve the latter problems should be liberally ap-
plied to testamentary appointments.
140. See Table at p. 408 supra.
141. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 126 supra.
143. See note 113 supra.
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The policies underlying the antilapse statutes can best be imple-
mented by applying them more broadly than has yet been suggested
by either courts or commentators. Thus, the statutes should be ap-
plied not only to appointments under general powers, but to those un-
der special powers as well; they should be applied to protect the rela-
tives of the donor as well as of the donee; finally, they should be
applied to protect the issue of appointees even when such issue are not
included in the designation of the objects of the power.
American courts, following their tradition of looking behind the
form of a statute to its underlying purposes and the substance of the
problems presented, can reach these results in construing existing stat-
utes.144 The process will be slow and uncertain, however. To avoid
the necessary expenses, uncertainties, and delays of the judicial pro-
cess, state legislatures should enact statutes like the one set forth
above to provide ample antilapse protection to appointees under pow-
ers exercised by will.
144. Justice Traynor has eloquently stated that the courts must be forward-looking
in interpreting new legislation which was enacted to overturn or redirect old common
law:
One way or another, the rising line of statutes and of judicial precedents are
likely at times to converge. It is not realistic, if it ever was, to view them as
parallel lines. The volume of lawmaking is now so great that we no longer can
afford to have judges retreat into formulism, as they have recurringly done in the
past to shield wooden precedents from any radiations of forward-looking statutes
while they ignored dry rot in the precedents themselves.
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. AM. L. REv. 401.
402 (1968).
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